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Abstract
The limited success to date, by the public health community, to address the dramatic rise in non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs) has prompted growing attention to the commercial determinants of health. This has led 
to a much needed shift in attention, from metabolic and behavioural risk factors, to the production and 
consumption of health-harming products by the commercial sector. Building on Lencucha and Thow’s analysis 
of neoliberalism, in shaping the underlying policy environment favouring commercial interests, we argue for 
fuller engagement with structure and agency interaction when conceptualising, assessing, and identifying public 
health measures to address the commercial determinants of health.
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Introduction
Since the late 19th century, the public health community 
has made substantial progress in understanding the causal 
role of bacteria, viruses, protozoa and other pathogens 
in communicable disease morbidity and mortality. 
Commensurate advances in prevention, control and treatment 
strategies, along with broader socioeconomic changes, have 
given rise to the so-called epidemiological transition in many 
societies. Fast forward to the early twenty-first century and 
we are witnessing a dramatic shift in recorded causes of 
death, from communicable to non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs). The latter – led by cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, 
cancers, and chronic respiratory diseases – now account for 
approximately 41 million deaths each year (71% of all deaths 
annually).1
While there is growing evidence that infections have a 
causal role in many chronic conditions,2 two-thirds of NCD 
deaths worldwide are related to tobacco use, alcohol misuse, 
unhealthy diets and physical inactivity.1 Alongside metabolic 
risk factors (eg, hypertension), therefore, public health 
efforts to date have focused on addressing these modifiable 
behavioural risk factors. Success at stemming the global 
NCD epidemic has so far been limited. As Horton describes, 
“progress has been inadequate and disappointingly slow….An 
advocacy strategy based on four diseases and four risk factors 
seems increasingly out of touch….And so they [public health 
community] are paralysed. We need a different approach.”3
The concept of the commercial determinants of health offers 
an important alternative perspective, notably by pushing 
against the notion that NCDs are primarily self-inflicted, and 
that people must simply be convinced of the error of their 
unhealthy ways. Broadly defined as “strategies and approaches 
used by the private sector to promote products and choices 
that are detrimental to health,”4 this emerging body of work 
shifts attention, from metabolic and behavioural risks, to the 
activities of the commercial sector. Of particular concern are 
the “ways corporations exert power” and the need to “align 
corporate behaviour more closely with the public good.”5 
Kickbusch et al, for example, identify four channels through 
which corporations exert influence – marketing, lobbying, 
corporate social responsibility initiatives, and supply chain 
management.4 In this way, commercial determinants press for 
an overdue shift in the public health gaze to more effective 
regulation of health-harming activities by corporations.
As this approach gains more traction, public health 
efforts would benefit from fuller understanding of the 
dual importance of structure and agency when addressing 
commercial determinants. The relative influence of structure 
and agency is a longstanding debate in social research. In 
public health, for example, this debate has pervaded discourses 
concerning certain types of health promotion interventions.6 
Briefly, agency concerns the individual and collective capacity 
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to make decisions and act independently through free choice. 
Structure relates to “the framework within which human 
agency takes place,”6 consisting of relationships, social forces, 
institutions and rules that shape choices. The interplay 
between agency and structure, and their relative importance 
for achieving social change, is an ongoing subject of debate. 
On the commercial determinants of health, it is essential that 
efforts to advance this promising approach do not limit the 
shift in focus, from the agency of individuals, to the agency 
of corporations.
It is in this respect that Lencucha and Thow’s analysis, of 
the relationship between neoliberalism and NCDs, is an 
important advance. The authors address the question of “what 
underlying conditions have shaped a policy environment 
that is conducive to the influence of commercial interests”7 
and, in doing so, open up an expanded conversation about 
the production and consumption of unhealthy products. 
Alongside transnational corporations, which further their 
interests through a variety of business and political strategies, 
Lencucha and Thow argue that the neoliberal paradigm 
“has conditioned the policy environment in a way that 
promotes the supply of unhealthy commodities.”7 Enshrined 
in the institutional fabric of contemporary societies, this 
dominant paradigm “has given rise to existing systems of 
governance of product environments, and how these systems 
create structural barriers to the introduction of meaningful 
policy action to prevent NCDs by fostering healthy product 
environments.”7 The authors are specifically interested in 
expanding the explanation of policy incoherence, where 
economic policies may undermine, and yet are given 
precedence, over public health policies. Drawing on examples 
from southern Africa, Lencucha and Thow argue that priority 
may be given to the production of unhealthy commodities, 
over protection of public health, even when the former’s 
contributions to economic development are limited. This is 
explained by “how the neoliberal paradigm has structured the 
institutional environment in economic, agricultural and other 
sectors that shapes the supply of unhealthy products.”7
Defining and Regulating “Undue Influence” by Commercial 
Interests
While Lencucha and Thow shine important light on how 
“the influence of health-harming industries on public policy 
is real and deeply problematic for public health,”7 what 
must then be done to effectively curb corporate agency 
merits further discussion. To deal with conflicts of interest 
and “outright corruption,”7 Article 5.3 of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control is appropriately identified as an important example 
to follow. For example, lobbying policy-makers, giving gifts or 
donations, and industry involvement in policy consultations 
should be restricted. Article 5.3 requires States Parties to 
prevent industry interference in setting and implementing 
public health policies. Beyond public health policy, WHO 
guidelines “encourage” Parties to “implement measures in 
all branches of government that may have an interest in, or 
the capacity to, affect public health policies with respect to 
tobacco control.”8 Efforts to improve policy coherence, and 
achieve a more integrated approach which spans the breadth 
of government, will be critical if the agency of health-harming 
industries is to be effectively regulated.
Importantly, the authors rightly describe how the problem 
of industry influence goes far beyond “state capture.” Evidence 
from whistleblowers and internal industry documents have 
revealed political strategies which are far from visible and, 
in some cases, intentionally concealed from public view. The 
revolving door between government and industry9; the covert 
funding of junk science by industry10; and the undeclared 
payment of journalists, celebrities and think tanks to frame 
public discourse11 are patterns of behaviour that span many 
industries including tobacco, alcohol, food and beverage. 
These obscured, highly effective political strategies need 
to be better regulated through improved mechanisms of 
transparency and accountability. This includes appropriate 
enforcement and penalties for noncompliance in order to be 
effective.12
More challenging, perhaps, is how undue influence is 
structurally enabled by the way governments have come to 
define their own raison d’etre, and thus the policy instruments 
deemed appropriate and desirable. Industry influence is 
legitimized by a ‘dominant paradigm’ which  goes to the heart 
of political philosophies underpinning liberal democracies. 
Pluralism, for instance, assumes that the role of political 
institutions is to mediate among diverse and competing 
interest groups. The common good, it is argued, is best 
achieved through market and civil society actors engaging in 
robust efforts to influence state actors. Pluralists thus accept 
industry influence as business as usual.13 Undue influence 
is seen as a problem arising from failings in the system of 
checks and balances, which then allows commercial actors 
to undermine the separation of powers underpinning 
liberal democracies. Public health debates about industry 
interference have yet to stray into deeper levels of political 
theory debate such as the potential limitations or design flaws 
in liberal democracies per se.
Policy Coherence and the Prioritization of Public Health
By offering a fuller explanation of policy incoherence, 
Lencucha and Thow appear to assume that public health 
goals merit priority over other policy goals such as economic 
growth. In reality, politics is about managing unlimited societal 
demands with limited public resources. Governing is a messy 
process of tradeoffs, compromises and mediation among 
many competing, sometimes incompatible, policy goals. For a 
variety of reasons, sometimes health policies prevail, but there 
are situations when they should not. Public interest, in other 
words, is not the same as public health interest. Economic 
growth, environmental protection, national security or key 
infrastructure projects might, for example, be prioritised over 
public health. As described above, undue influence by vested 
interests can indeed distort this process. But the fact that 
public health goals are not prioritised does not necessarily 
mean that this is the case.
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What Creative Ideas Might We Put Forth to Challenge 
Neoliberal Hegemony?
The dominance of the neoliberal paradigm, as an underlying 
condition shaping “a policy environment that is conducive 
to the influence of commercial interests,” is a daunting but 
essential revelation. Unhealthy products that contribute 
to NCDs arise as much, if not more so, from structural or 
“underlying conditions,” as agency or the choices made 
by consumers, producers and governments. Indeed, some 
scholars view neoliberalism broadly, as a social ideology 
and social determinant of health, highlighting the need to 
incorporate political economy approaches to understanding 
public health and health inequalities.14 How then might one 
start to change those conditions? 
It is first necessary to remind ourselves that neoliberalism 
is a moment in history, full of contradiction and subject to 
change. Neoliberalism is presented by Lencucha and Thow 
as somewhat ahistorical, rather than, playing out over time 
and place. Even neoliberalism’s most passionate acolytes 
now recognise that it would be foolish, like Percy Shelley’s 
Ozymandias, to assume the “end of history.” There are deeply 
troubling warning signs of neoliberalism’s contradictions, 
most notably, stark wealth inequalities and alarming global 
climate change, which have generated widespread disillusion 
with the existing political and economic order.
On unhealthy products, more specifically, mainstream 
approaches to tackling NCDs have so far overwhelmingly 
focused on so-called demand-side measures which seek to 
change the modifiable behaviours of consumers. Yet there 
are important opportunities to leverage social change by 
giving attention to the full breadth of global value chains 
to implement underused supply-side measures (eg, fiscal 
measures, licensing, taxation). “Climate-smart agriculture 
measures,” for example, can be broadly categorized into 
three types of supply-side measures – reducing emissions, 
enhancing sinks, and fossil fuel offsetting.15 Climate change 
advocates have pressed large institutions worldwide to divest 
from the fossil fuel industries. Along the journey from leaf to 
lung, tobacco control advocates have begun to draw attention 
to extended producer responsibility for the billions of cigarette 
butts polluting the planet.16 Beyond discouraging production 
and consumption of unhealthy products, in other words, are 
multiple points of potential public health intervention that 
can change the underlying structures that shape action.
Finally, there is much work to do within the public health 
community. Understanding how neoliberal ideas, institutions 
and interests permeate societies worldwide suggests limited 
prospects for approaches mainly focused on metabolic 
and modifiable behavioural risk factors. WHO defines a 
risk factor as “any attribute, characteristic or exposure of 
an individual that increases the likelihood of developing a 
disease or injury.”17 This important discussion of the influence 
of neoliberalism, by Lencucha and Thow, points to an urgent 
need to better understand the dynamic interaction between 
structure and agency in creating risk factors for NCDs. 
This includes understanding of two ideological pillars of 
neoliberalism – how neoliberalism shapes the structures 
within which corporations exert their influence (ie, free 
markets), and how neoliberalism shapes where agency is seen 
to lie (ie, individual responsibility). Commercial determinants 
of health thus offer a promising way forward if we go beyond 
the activities of profit-seeking, health-harming corporations. 
As a next step, a fuller definition and accompanying metrics, 
to better define and measure the risks arising from the 
commercial determinants of health, would significantly 
enhance explanations of, and actions to address, the alarming 
rise in NCDs globally.
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